Person casting a paper ballot in a box with the logo of the Venezuelan National Electoral Council (CNE). Photo: File photo.
By Misión Verdad – Aug 28, 2024
At the center of the regime-change operation in Venezuela, Edmundo González’s campaign command, ConVzla, launched two websites online as a parallel National Electoral Council (CNE). In doing so, González violated Venezuelan electoral laws which forbid any organization other than the CNE from presenting alleged results.
The website resultadosconvzla.com, whose domain was acquired on July 27, is subject to review and controversy for hosting the alleged voting records in the hands of the far-right opposition. Various analyses have found a series of serious inconsistencies and concluded that more than 80% of these documents had probably been modified or are false.
This registry is the one that theoretically provides the basis for calculating the election results —according to ConVzla— published on the website elecciones2024venezuela.com, another website that, also in theory, claims the power to publish numbers that supposedly give Edmundo González the victory in the presidential elections.
The website resultadosconvzla.com includes over 9,000 supporting documents which, if real, would represent 30% of the more than 30,000 polling stations that opened on July 28, making it clear that, in addition to being seriously questionable, these documents do not represent the majority of the voting records generated on election day.
It should be added that, up to now, there is no possibility of auditing the opposition’s “records” through legal or institutional means.
The Supreme Court of Justice (TSJ), through the Electoral Chamber, conducted an expert appraisal of the July 28 elections. Edmundo González was summoned to appear before that institution and did not attend. He also did not offer the highest judicial body the tallies or “voting records,” hence the material that “proves” the opposition “victory” is outside expert appraisal.
According to the Machado/González duo—let us not fail to mention it—within the framework of their strategy to provoke regime change in Venezuela on the basis of false electoral results, the candidate of the Unitary Platform (PUD) would have obtained 7,303,480 votes (67.08%), while Nicolás Maduro would have received 3,316,142 (30.46%).
For his part, on August 2, with the publication of the second bulletin, the president of the CNE, Elvis Amoroso, confirmed that Nicolás Maduro was reelected with 6,408,844 (51.9%), while González gathered 5,326,104 (43.1%) votes.
This analysis will review both figures, comparing the previous electoral behavior, the political dynamics surrounding the day, and the qualitative factors that make up the controversy expressed in numbers.
What the opposition data seeks to say
Eugenio Martínez (@puzkas) has published from his social media account a comparative table of the Chavista vote in elections for representative positions since the 2006 presidential elections. There, a pronounced downward “trend line” can be seen that reaches the alleged 3,316,142 votes that Nicolás Maduro would have obtained on July 28, according to parallel (and therefore illegal) data published by the opposition.
The graph in question was created by the NGO Votoscopio, directed by Martínez himself:
All numbers in the graph, except those for 2024, are official and issued by the CNE.
The elections in which Chavismo received the most votes were the four presidential elections of 2006, 2012, 2013, and 2018, while in the other electoral processes, although Chavismo was the percentage majority, the numbers were lower.
This is a common behavior of voters in general, both Chavistas and opposition, who tend to participate in greater numbers in presidential elections.
Chavista voters, it can be said, give more relevance to the presidential elections because of the inherent significance of the presidential office to their political project.
The 3,316,142 votes that the opposition gives to Maduro in 2024 is the only factor that breaks the voting trend of the Bolivarian Revolution in presidential elections. This can be seen more clearly by intervening in the image.
According to the CNE, the 2012 presidential elections were those that gave the most votes to Chavismo, with 8,184,383, while in the 2018 presidential elections, this number reached 6,288,430.
The area indicated in the dotted box (in the graphic above) refers, precisely, to the electoral maximums and minimums of Chavismo in presidential elections, reaffirming that the information offered by the opposition breaks the parameters, putting its 2024 figure as the lowest vote not only in presidential elections but in all elections.
The alleged data released, let us remember, illegally, by the González/Machado campaign command contrasts with the parameters in several ways.
One of them is, as can be seen in the graph above, that the CNE data corresponding to the 2020 elections reflect that Chavismo obtained 4,331,388 votes.
That vote, supposedly higher than that of 2024, took place in the context of an election where general participation was remarkably low, because only 30.18% of the Permanent Electoral Registry (REP) went to the polls.
The July 28 elections would be, according to the opposition, the only one with medium-high participation, according to its record, in which Chavismo did not support its candidate, against the current of its tradition.
In fact, it would be the election where it had the worst performance, even compared to the apathetic elections of 2020. At first glance and by simple reasoning, the data seem implausible.
It is worth pausing to point out that in any election, any political force is subject to electoral setbacks. Any force can win or lose overwhelmingly. But the factors of such a phenomenon reside in the real political denominators of the momentum or context of the election.
An election day that would give Chavismo such a low figure of support, just over 3 million votes—as the opposition claims—would be marked by a notably adverse national context or with such a serious negative accumulation that it implies the rupture of the cohesion of the Chavista forces and their support base in a deep, generalized, and extended way.
A party could consolidate its support base only in extraordinary circumstances. The 2018-2024 period has not seen such upheavals.
In terms of the national context, it could be said that the 2018-2024 cycle was much less adverse than the 2013-2018 period due to the strength of the economic period recorded, the social indicators, the impact of the coercive measures against the Venezuelan economy, and the level of general upheaval in the country.
In the 2020-2024 period, the Venezuelan economy began to grow in the last quarter of 2021 (LINK). The country achieved institutional stabilization since the 2020 parliamentary elections; the most aggressive mechanisms of the external economic pressure agenda were contracted by re-establishing the commercial relationship with various oil companies; the exchange rate was stabilized, hyperinflation was stopped, and price increases were minimized.
Taken together, the variables for the 2020-2024 period do not suggest conditions that would accelerate such an aggressive loss of support as the opposition suggests, according to its “data.”
In other words, according to the qualitative parameters of the country context, the data offered by the opposition would have been more coherent in the context of the 2018 election.
In graphic terms, the Chavista vote—again, according to González/Machado—would have suffered a collapse in the presidential elections in the following way:
According to the graph above, Chavismo would have lost more votes in the 2018-2024 period (almost 3 million) than it lost in the 2013-2018 period (1.2 million compared to 2013). This, taking into consideration that the 2013-2018 period was much more complex and aggressive in all political, economic, and social indicators.
María Corina Machado and other political actors from the extremist fringe of the opposition claim—in order to explain their unverifiable figures—that the Chavista base “rebelled ” against Maduro. But this is impossible to determine according to reliable data parameters, given that in Venezuela, the vote is secret and there is no public evidence that this happened in this way.
However, there are truly objective indicators that indicate that Chavismo has solid electoral organizations which do influence its electoral base (the minimum voting base).
There are more than five million active militia members who fully identify with Chavismo. The PSUV party has an organizational structure of 300,000 street and community leaders, as well as support through 30,000 electoral centers (UBCHs), parishes, and municipalities.
There are also 100,000 social and community organizations, parties, and movements of various kinds that form a support base for Chavismo, as an alternative to the PSUV. This is the “electoral machine” of Chavismo.
This suggests that the support base registered in the electoral organization reaches an estimate of more than 6 million people in all these instances of party membership and sympathy.
ConVzla’s discourse, supported by parallel results websites, suggests that five out of ten people co-opted in the various territorial and sectoral levels of Chavismo voted for Edmundo González, and the only element on which they base this statement are their figures published outside the election, which are unverifiable, not subject to the TSJ’s expertise, and seriously questioned, since a large part of their “records” were digitally modified.
What the official CNE data says
The CNE, after having 96.87% of the results transmitted, reported that Nicolás Maduro Moros, candidate of the Gran Polo Patriótico, was reelected with 6,408,844 (51.95%) of the votes.
For his part, Edmundo González obtained 5,326,104 votes (43.18%). Meanwhile, eight other opposition candidates together collected almost 5% of the valid votes.
It is necessary to look at these figures and compare the electoral registers, as proposed by Eugenio Martínez, according to the registry of the different types of elections since 2006.
Based on the records reported by the CNE, it can be said that the votes that President Maduro obtained in the 2024 presidential elections would be within the track record of Chavismo in presidential elections since 2006.
With more than 6.4 million votes, he would have obtained a result barely higher than the vote obtained in the difficult year of 2018, where he obtained just over 6.288 million.
From a qualitative approach, this result would be supported by two political variables.
The first is the national context in the cycle corresponding to 2020-2024, which was characterized by better general conditions of political stability, economic recovery, and the stabilization of the critical nodes of the multifaceted socioeconomic crisis.
Furthermore, an electoral result of more than 6 million votes is consistent with the structures mentioned above.
In purely organic matters, Chavismo can back up more than 6 million votes, which are within the electoral limits of its performance in the presidential elections of the cycle led by Nicolás Maduro, as can be seen in the following graph.
The above graph suggests an electoral behavior similar to that of the overall political dynamics in Venezuela, going through a cycle of deteriorating socio-political and socio-economic conditions that implied a considerable loss of support for Maduro (and the opposition) by 2018, creating a political floor in presidential elections.
But the progressive economic recovery, institutional stability, and social tranquility after 2020 also allude to the possibility of a modest but significant recovery of support for Maduro by 2024, placing this election in the middle ground between the floor in 2018 and the ceiling obtained in 2013.
For its part, the opposition, based on the data provided by the CNE, including those from July 28, has had a significant recovery compared to the 2018 presidential elections. Therefore, the more than 5 million votes obtained in 2024 are fully within its canon with respect to its lowest and highest points recorded.
The above graph, in fact, gives a high weighting to the opposition for the year 2018, considering that it is the sum of just over 1.9 million votes obtained by Henri Falcón and just over 1 million obtained by the leader Javier Bertucci. In that election, the opposition was divided, and some opposition parties boycotted the election.
The more than 5.3 million votes obtained by Edmundo González describe other real dynamics which were also present in the July 28 election.
For instance, electoral cohesion was lower in this presidential election, since several governors and mayors did not support González consistently, and several leaders even distanced themselves from him, declaring themselves independent days before the elections.
The PUD went with an unknown and senile candidate, whose only strength was based on a transfer of support from María Corina Machado.
Another significant fact is that the hegemonic sector of the opposition, represented by the PUD, had been absent from the polls in several recent processes, making it impossible for its electoral machinery to develop.
For its part, the Vente Venezuela organization, led by María Corina Machado, is not a formal political party; it had never participated in open elections and, therefore, lacked real machinery tested in a conventional presidential election.
Venezuelan opposition members themselves have stated that some 4.5 million Venezuelans registered in the electoral register have left Venezuela and have not been able to register to vote abroad.
According to the opposition, anti-Chavistas are overwhelmingly the majority among these millions of voters, which, according to their own analysis, means that they have lost a number of voters in the millions.
Unlike what the Comando ConVzla does with the electoral history of Chavismo, the CNE data for the 2024 presidential elections does not ignore the electoral dimensions of the opposition; on the contrary, it reaffirms them, since it places the voting tendency for Edmundo González within the parameters outlined in the records.
An example of this would be that the votes obtained by González Urrutia indicate the loss of 2 million votes since the 2013 presidential elections, which confirms the statements made by his own political camp, including those of Eugenio Martínez, who claim that a considerable part of his support base has emigrated.
Another example is that Edmundo González would have obtained 2.4 million more votes than Henri Falcón and Javier Bertucci obtained combined in 2018.
This difference coincides with the statistics of an election partially boycotted by some political parties that called for abstention in 2018.
Electoral abstention and emigration by a segment of the electorate are believed to be the reason why the 2018 presidential election had the lowest turnout since 2006, with only 46% of the REP voting.
From 2018 to 2024, the recovery of the opposition vote would have been very significant. The result for 2024 (CNE figures) almost doubles the 2018 vote. This would be a reasonable margin.
The history of the successive opposition electoral umbrellas, according to legal figures, is graphically reflected as follows:
According to the Electoral authority, the parliamentary elections of 2015, the presidential elections of 2013 and the presidential elections of 2012 were the elections prior to 2024 where the opposition showed its best performance.
In fourth place would be its performance in the presidential elections on July 28 of this year, which places the official figure (corroborated by the TSJ’s expert opinion) for 2024 within the average range of votes obtained by the opposition in relevant elections.
The graph also shows that, like Chavismo, in presidential elections, the sympathizers of the opposition spectrum come together and participate much more than in elections for other offices, with the exception being the victory they achieved in the parliamentary elections of 2015, when they participated with a cohesion of parties and construction of an electoral machinery and where they managed to capitalize on the general economic discontent, promising the voters a “last line” (something they did not fulfill), in reference to the shortage of basic products at that time.
The data within the dotted lines highlight that, according to the CNE, in 2024, we insist, the opposition achieved a significant recovery, returning it to being a competitive force in a context in which they managed to polarize despite there being other candidates competing in the race, apart from the candidate for reelection.
However, the pattern of loss of opposition votes is confirmed if viewed through the filter of the 2015 numbers, which could be explained, among several factors, by the aforementioned immigration issue, which has also been pointed out by right-wing electoral analysts.
Electoral dynamics: Chavismo vs. oppositions and conclusions
The track record of both political poles shows that their electorates participate similarly in each election, increasing their interest in presidential elections and reducing their participation in regional and municipal elections.
In other words, the general margin of participation is the transversal factor that has had a definitive impact on these electoral dynamics.
There is a common factor in the elections where the opposition had a significant performance: those where there was high general participation.
In the case of the 2012 elections, it was 80%. In the 2013 presidential elections, it was 79%. In the 2015 parliamentary elections, it was 74%.
In competitive elections, in the context of the general public interest, voting increases and benefits the parties of the opposition spectrum, since surely a number of abstentionists, undecided, or politically disaffiliated voters lean towards the options that oppose Chavismo.
The dubious data published by Comando ConVzla in August 2024 propose a total break with all electoral parameters and historic behavior. Voter turnout was 59.9% according to the CNE. The opposition, with its parallel electoral “institution” offers a similar percentage: 60% turnout.
According to the discourse spread by the González/Machado duo and those around them, this would be the first election on record where, with an average level of electoral participation for a presidential election, the opposition wins, overwhelmingly, with a difference of 37% in favor of Edmundo González. This is technically delusional.
As we stated before, in electoral processes, almost anything is possible. But based on the records and dynamics, the data promoted by ConVzla through the two websites would be very unlikely, especially if we consider that for something like this to have happened, more than half of the Chavista electoral base, which is fully identified in the lists of the different related structures and mechanisms explained above, would have participated in the election with the aim of voting for the opposition.
In any case, the usual behavior of dissatisfied voters is to abstain, but the opposition suggests that they deliberately voted against Maduro.
59 or 60% voter turnout suggests that about 7 out of 10 voters in Venezuela would have participated on July 28.
Figures released by parallel websites indicate that the people included in the lists of Chavista voters, who could reach 6 million sympathizers and activists, not only participated in the election (they claim that 60% did), but also did so to vote against Maduro.
As we have already explained, in Venezuela the vote is secret, and there are no objective ways to corroborate it. Furthermore, such an assessment is only based on the unusual and unverifiable numbers presented by the Venezuelan opposition.
According to this highly dubious data, the electoral history would be graphed as follows:
Unofficial data published by the opposition, corresponding to the July 28 election, propose the most atypical electoral behavior recorded in the 2006-2024 timeline. They describe the supposedly most astonishing rebound in the country’s political history in two decades, but also the worst landslide for Chavismo seen on record.
There is no objective basis to defend a result of this nature. As we have already stated, there are only 30% of supposed voting records (assuming that they are actually capable of being verified) on a website, which were not subject to the expert appraisal carried out by the Electoral Chamber of the TSJ, and in which immense irregularities have already been detected.
Meanwhile, the overall performance of Chavismo and the opposition combined, according to official data corresponding to July 28, can be represented graphically in this way:
The CNE’s information regarding 2024, on the other hand, places the result within previous trends, in line with the historical behavior between Chavismo and the opposition.
The July 28 election was competitive and polarized, given that part of the electorate is outside the country and was unable to change its status on the electoral registry (REP) to cast a vote abroad.
With a 59.9% participation of the REP, Chavismo materializes in votes the intention of its militants and sympathizers estimated at more than 6 million voters, according to various sources of organizational records, while the opposition rebounds to achieve a good harvest of votes, framing it among its historical highs.
The official (and legal) numbers are a very clear contrast to the data offered by the Comando ConVzla, completely outside of any historical electoral trends, which also contradicts the statements that Machado/González, etc., have made about voters outside of Venezuela.
It is necessary to insist on the relevance of the general participation figure and its impact on the opposition’s support. Chavismo is the electoral force with the least tendency to abstain. Its base remains at constant levels, while the right only obtains good results when there is a high electoral participation, as reflected in the REP itself.
In the 2018 presidential elections, with a partial boycott and part of the electorate already emigrating, the REP registered a 46% turnout. It was in this election where the opposition had its worst performance in presidential elections.
For mathematical reasons, this speaks of the extremely low possibility that the opposition will outperform Chavismo by almost 3 million votes and 37 percentage points in an election with an average turnout of 59.9%, as stated by the CNE and as alleged by the opposition, with a 60.0% turnout.
Venezuelan electoral historians say that the determining and transversal factor in electoral processes is the level of general participation.
Considering that the Venezuelan elections and the counting of voting intentions by militants and sympathizers are based on the organizations, the political machinery, and the lists of co-opted voters—and it has been proven that this is the case for Chavismo—it is unlikely that the Venezuelan opposition won by the margins they claim to have won. Voter participation would have had to have been much higher, between 75 and 80%, for the opposition to be able to achieve a comfortable percentage advantage.
Finally, due to the treatment of the data and the historical political tendencies of the Venezuelan right, we conclude that ConVzla most certainly published inflated and false data and that with this, they have raised the level of sophistication of their methods—publishing data under the Súmate scheme (parallel institutionality) and committing electoral crimes—to claim fraud, as they have done in almost all elections held since 2004.
Given the picture promoted by the far-right opposition and foreign actors of delegitimization, attempts at institutional breakdown, political street violence, calls for insubordination of Venezuelan military personnel, and foreign interference, since July 28, a new escalation in the continued operation of regime change has developed in Venezuela.
Therefore, and based on this analysis, it must be concluded that the figures disclosed on parallel websites, without any verification, with manipulated information, are unreal and are, in themselves, an instrument of the overall regime-change operation that they have undertaken against the government and all the public powers of Venezuela.
The Electoral Chamber of the Supreme Court of Venezuela, starting this week, ratified the results published by the CNE that declared the re-elected president Nicolás Maduro the winner, and requested the publication of the detailed electoral results of July 28, according to each table and electoral center.
Translation: Orinoco Tribune
OT/JRE/SL
Misión Verdad
Misión Verdad is a Venezuelan investigative journalism website with a socialist perspective in defense of the Bolivarian Revolution
